

History and Moral Education in Correctional Education

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Ces cinq dernières années, l'histoire a été l'une des deux disciplines requises dans le programme de l'Université de Victoria à l'Institution Matsqui, la seconde étant l'anglais. Ayant enseigné l'histoire au sein de ce programme pendant quatre de ces années, je ne pouvais établir clairement pourquoi l'histoire devait mériter une telle prééminence dans un programme axé sur le développement moral des prisonniers. Cet article tente de répondre à la question et pèse la contribution qu'apporte l'étude de l'histoire à une tel processus.

For the past five years history has been one of two required disciplines in the University of Victoria program at Matsqui Institution, the other being English. Having taught history in that program for four of those years, I was never really sure why history should figure so prominently in a program built around the encouragement of moral development in prisoners. This paper is an attempt to answer that question and to assess the contribution the study of history can make in such a process.

The University of Victoria has been offering liberal arts courses at Matsqui Institution since 1973. Starting as a small project with only a few courses in English, history, and psychology, the program has expanded considerably, offering a BA degree in several fields. The range of academic subjects has broadened to include most of the social sciences as well as introductory science and fine arts courses, all fully accredited. There are three full-time university staff members and usually at least five part-time instructors with an average of 50 students enrolled in each four-month term.¹ History and English remain the core disciplines in the program in part because of their unique role in the central basis of the program, the encouragement of moral development in the students concerned, and in part because of their traditional emphasis on writing skills.

The first and continually most surprising aspect of the history component of the university program is its popularity among the students. This is especially striking given the opposite condition on a normal university campus where history has been a discipline "in trouble" for the past two decades. Two considerations affect this difference. First, "popular" history is as popular as ever among most people, and prisoners tend to come from that middle class/working class sector of the population that reads historical novels and other accessible forms of history.

Secondly, because prisoners tend to have a lot of time on their hands, they read a lot — more, one suspects, than the average citizen. A history teacher always looking for people to teach could only regard these circumstances as fortunate.

Yet I had some reservations about this good fortune. My students seemed to be attracted to history for very self-serving reasons and took from the discipline only that which they found to be supportive of their preconceived notions of the world. This, of course, is quite normal if not academically sound. The problem, however, lay with the nature of the students and their notions of the world, their *Weltanschauung*. As an historian, I have been trained to look for the unique in human affairs and to be very sceptical of generalizations and “grand theories.” My first impulse upon reflecting on my students at Matsqui was, therefore, to see them almost exclusively as individuals. This was reinforced by my initial impression that while they may be criminals, they did not appear to be all that different from myself, an impression that was heightened by the opposite expectation upon first entering the institution.

This individualist analysis lasted for some time. The first signs of disillusionment appeared with the first recidivist. The more I learned about my students’ behavior, the patterns that seemed to lead to a return to crime, the more I began to question my initial assumptions. By that time the empirical and impressionistic data of several years of constant exposure to and discussions with the prisoner/students began to have its effect. Intellectual struggles in the classroom that had seemed random or isolated at first became repetitive as each class seemed to pursue the same questions. The pervasive sense of cynicism concerning human motivation in history, the easy acceptance of conspiracy theories about the past and the attraction to deterministic models all began to fit together. Starting from no a priori assumptions myself concerning criminals as a group, the common attitudes, thought patterns, and assumptions of most of my students were leading to some sort of a general theory.

My attempts to generalize based on the experience of my classes took place within the framework of Kohlberg’s theory of moral development, that being the original theoretical base of the entire University of Victoria effort at Matsqui. Testing and interviews carried out within the program indicate that a significant percentage of the student body at Matsqui were at Kohlberg’s Stage 2 upon entering the program (Ayers and Parlett, 1975). While I cannot attempt to draw a profile of the prototype criminal or sketch a criminal personality, Kohlberg’s model of Stage 2 thinking patterns certainly fits a great many of the men in my classes:

Stage 2 is characterized by egocentric, instrumental thinking; questions of right and wrong are answered only in terms of personal need and satisfaction. Rudimentary elements of fairness and equal sharing are present, but only at the level of ‘honor among thieves’. Reciprocity is conceived only in terms of the equal exchange of favors or blows relative to everyone’s getting

his own share. 'You scratch my back, and I'll scratch yours' is the defining norm at this stage, rather than loyalty, gratitude, conscience, or justice. (Fishkin, 1973, p. 110)²

This stage of development or consciousness is, of course, constantly reinforced by the prison environment so that if it is only latent in some, it very quickly moves to the forefront in determining daily behavior. In the classroom it manifested itself in an almost complete inability to make what historians call the "imaginative leap" into another space-time consciousness and an almost obsessive concern for material reciprocity in human relations.

The English historian G. R. Elton, in commenting on the teaching of history to adolescents, argues that it directly attacks the primary characteristic of this type of thinking, egocentrism or referring all experience to oneself. "Even the famous idealism of youth is usually little more than uninformed self-righteousness and the inability to conceive of a set of circumstances and attitudes different from one's own." He goes on to note that there is really nothing wrong in this "provided the condition is transitory; growing up means outgrowing this phase" (Elton, 1978). If the problem of moving out of this egocentric stage of cognitive/moral development is simply one of growing up, then the task in dealing with adults is at once more complex and more promising — complex because the students are already grown up and have a larger stake in preserving or defending their attitudes and assumptions. On the other hand, as Kohlberg has recently stressed, life experience as an adult is crucial to the ability to move beyond his Stage 4. Thus in working with adults it may be reasonable to expect more change in moral reasoning abilities than with "normal" adolescents or young college students (Kohlberg, 1973).

The University of Victoria program emphasizes the role of cognitive growth in producing changes in moral reasoning which in turn facilitates changed behavior. This, in turn, is based on two premises which have their origin both in theory and in observation. First, the criminal has been more a decision-maker than a victim. That is, despite environmental, family, and class factors, there remains a strong element of choice in the act of becoming a criminal. While there certainly are individuals in prison for whom this does not apply, for most men in federal institutions decision-making is a strong component of behavior.³ This group, which I refer to as professional criminals, cannot be seen as a rigid category. It exists in its purest form in what one observer describes as the "rounder" or "true criminal," but for the majority of the men involved in crime it remains a process of "becoming" (Letkemann, 1973, p. 20).⁴

The second premise operative in this paper is that the decisions of the criminal are made in the context of a certain stage of cognitive/moral development and that this stage can be altered in order to facilitate

different decisions within the same or similar environment. Thus the emphasis is on cognitive growth rather than direct behavior change. We therefore do not attempt to deliberately or directly affect the value system of the individual student, the usual tactic of programs emphasizing affective education.⁵ For instance, if the students we are concerned with are excessively egocentric, this manifests itself in an equally extreme ethnocentrism and in political terms in intolerance of other peoples, cultures, and practices. By emphasizing academic work in history and, in this case, anthropology, we attack the manifestations of this consciousness and thereby hope to affect the source. The connection, however, is theirs to make; we neither teach moral rules (what Kohlberg calls the “bag of virtues”) nor rely on abstract principles such as justice or equality, but rather address these issues through the content of academic courses.⁶

All of the foregoing raises a very contentious issue for any teacher: the role of values or moral judgments in the process of instruction. This is a particularly difficult issue for the historian who is constantly concerned with issues involving ethical choices by characters in the past and is a discipline that cannot yet decide whether it is a value-free social science or part of the humanities. The issue is even more important in a program centred on moral education in a prison with a student body that demonstrates a remarkably consistent moral framework that has manifested itself in socially unacceptable behavior.

It is clear that the criminal is generally not amoral, lacking a moral structure or without a conscience. David Matza has argued convincingly that while there are some who reject society’s moral codes absolutely, most seem to accept them in principle but develop excuses for their inability to abide by them, what he calls neutralization (Taylor, 1973, p. 176).⁷ This neutralization process stems from what Kohlberg would describe as faulty or underdeveloped reasoning abilities, a condition which can be changed through cognitive processes.

To accomplish this growth in reasoning abilities, Kohlberg tries to thread the needle between value-laden and value-free teaching. He insists that education in general should have a strong moral content in the way it is presented to the student, that teachers have a duty to confront the issues of morality and justice with their students and that to avoid that responsibility is in fact “immoral” (Gustafson, 1970, p. 9). A supporter of Kohlberg presents the argument as follows:

It is morally and pedagogically correct to teach *about* ethics, and the *skills* of moral analysis rather than doctrine, and to set out the arguments for and against tolerance and pluralism. All of this is undone if you imply that all the various incompatible views about abortion or pornography or war are equally right, or likely to be right, or deserving of respect. Pluralism requires respecting the right to *hold* divergent beliefs; it implies *neither* tolerance of *actions* based on those beliefs *nor* respecting the *content* of the beliefs. (Scriven, 1975, p. 694)

Above all the point is that moral content is not to be taught but rather the practice of critical thinking encouraged through confrontation with moral issues. It is this issue of critical thinking combined with a knowledge of ethical issues that is the key to the cognitive-developmental approach. Without this, cognitive learning may only increase the strength of an existing stage of moral development by broadening its range of defences or rationales (Lickona, 1976, p. 14). A totally value-free program might only provide Matza's neutralizers with more sophisticated arguments. In my own case, the popularity of history in the Matsqui program became less than reassuring since it could mean that the discipline was merely supportive of the status quo.

The task, then, was to confront this rather pervasive world view or common consciousness within the student body through the mechanism of university courses, in my case history courses. The confrontation was assured because in virtually every discipline the students consistently defended their position and perceptions and attacked any that ran counter to them. An instructor not prepared to defend quite vigorously his own position soon lost any real influence in the class and, somewhat perversely, if he had no position at all lost the respect of the class. In each case the students sought out information and viewpoints that fit their position and attempted to exclude any information that did not.

There were two quite opposite approaches to history that seemed to find a response among the students at Matsqui. The first was a highly deterministic view of the past, popular with students also involved in the social sciences. They tended to see the past as full of inevitabilities and adopted a mechanistic, "vulgar Marxist" view of man as helpless pawn confronted by overpowering economic forces. This, of course, complemented a self-view of criminal as victim and therefore responsible for neither past nor future behavior. The second view, which was even more popular, was an individualistic, "great man" view of history. For these students, it was the supermen of the past, the bandits, heroes, and manipulators that made history move. This interpretation was supportive of the self-image of the criminal as risk-taker, fighting the system.

In both these views of history, it should be noted, there is no room for idealism, altruism, or selfless acts. They are irrelevant in the first and totally out of place in the second. In both there is an utter and complete cynicism about man and society. For the first, passive "getting on" is the most advantageous lifestyle; for the second, the drive to become one of the supermen, to ally oneself with one or do one's best to keep out of their way.

These views are, of course, found in any university classroom. They are, however, the two extremes of a continuum and most students would tend to fall somewhere in the middle. In the prison classroom, most students are on the extremes and the few in the middle are seldom heard. Other things are striking about these viewpoints. First, they are firmly

held, thought out and in some cases backed up with extensive arguments, some reasonable and some specious. Rather than facing a *tabula rasa*, the instructor in this environment must first erase and then begin to rebuild if he wishes to have some kind of impact. Secondly, both points of view are clearly derivative — that is, they are supportive of a much more basic or fundamental view of the world and the individual's place in it derived from personal experience, and are not mere intellectual constructs. It is because of this that they are so difficult to dislodge, since to admit to a weakness in this area opens up weaknesses in areas outside the classroom. It is in this fact which in part accounts for the vitality of the classroom experience and for the attraction of instructors to this teaching environment.

These attitudes and interpretations manifested themselves in every history course, especially when an issue or example was raised which ran counter to the dominant view. For example, we spent days arguing about the motivation of the Jesuit missionaries in New France, most of the students convinced that they had to be deeply involved in the fur trade and funneling private fortunes back to France. From Martin Luther to Mao there were persistent arguments about personal gain; what did *they* get out of their activities? The role of ideas, ideologies, or ideals in human affairs was constantly minimized or underestimated as they looked for economic determinants or personal gain as the key explanatory factors.

The most extreme and frequently bitter debates in the classes centred on the clash between idealism and cynicism. While I consider myself a realist on most matters, the negative consensus of my students drove me to an almost naive idealism at times. Eventually I decided to deliberately move in that direction and use this clash to illustrate the rigidity of their position, choosing post-1949 China as a case in point. Using William Hinton's *Fanshen* as a text, we struggled over each chapter. Whereas in other teaching situations I might act as a counterweight to Hinton's rather idealized portrayal of the Chinese revolution, at Matsqui I emphasized the idealism and altruism implicit throughout the book. While no transformation occurred among the students, most at least came to respect Hinton's position as a possibly valid one. As was typical in many other cases, admission of a change of view came much later and in private.

In the case of China and virtually every other example, monocausal explanations were the norm, generally centring on economics or the political power derived from economic power. A small, elite ruling class in each society was seen to manipulate the whole and historians who argued for a more pluralist interpretation were propagandists or, more charitably, dupes of that elite. During a course on American foreign policy, most of the term was taken up with arguments about American historians and how they had to be literally lying when they presented a positive side

to American expansionism. It was impossible for the students to accept that these men might believe what they were saying. While in many cases I was sympathetic with their scepticism, I was quite taken aback by their immediate assumption of duplicity rather than seeking the ideological origins of the interpretation.

The study of Nazi Germany provides an almost perfect forum for dealing with most of these unique characteristics of the prisoner/students. Any survey of popular military history or the advertisements in pulp magazines shows a disturbing level of interest in Nazi history and memorabilia. We know that Nazism remains an attractive myth not only to some Germans but to people in other parts of the world who seek simple solutions to complex problems and frustrations. We know that in many prisons, particularly in the United States, there are Nazi cults and organizations among the prisoners. At Matsqui, the students are sophisticated enough to know that open sympathy for the Nazis is impolitic, but there was obviously a great deal of latent attraction.

In looking for the source of this attraction, the issue of power seemed paramount. Prisoners are for the most part powerless and exist in an extremely authoritarian environment. Rather than react to that situation by philosophically rejecting authoritarianism, for the most part they seem to merely want to reverse roles. In the prison environment the concept of power seems quite clear: some have it and others do not. Those who have power wear uniforms, have weapons, and make the rules. For those whose past history involves consistent trouble with the law (the great majority) most of their lives outside prison are dominated by the same conception and reality of power.

Power in this framework becomes an object, a possession. If you have power, it is used; if you do not have power you suffer, and deservedly so since there is very little respect or sympathy for the victim in such situations. Nazi Germany seems to confirm this viewpoint since power in that society seems very visible and concrete. There are uniforms, guns, elite groups, a powerful and ruthless army, and plenty of powerless victims. Beyond this issue there is the "demonology" associated with Hitler, the idea of the superman with the hypnotic eyes against whom no resistance was possible and the racism of the Nazi system.

To attack this version of German history requires considerable effort because the myths run deep. The Nazis, who excelled at offering simple solutions to Germany's complex social and economic problems, can be shown to have had no solutions at all short of destruction. My approach to the subject is to break the Nazi apparatus down into its individual, highly competitive component parts, showing the virtual paralysis of power that was endemic to the Nazi hierarchy. Far from being an efficient machine, the totalitarian state is notorious for its inefficiency, mistakes, and self-destructive tendencies. Above all, the subject must be

demystified, both the system and the leader, much in the tradition of Hannah Arendt's treatment of Adolf Eichmann.

There are other classic examples from recent history which can be used to place the issue of power in some perspective, the most well known being the Cuban missile crisis and, in the end, the failure of the Americans to exercise their full power in Southeast Asia. When the Vietnam war is examined, the students tend to argue that the Americans could have won if they had not been weak at home. This allows the instructor to investigate in more depth the viability of power in international affairs and the need to balance power against domestic or economic considerations.

These issues are particularly relevant to the university program at Matsqui because in the daily operation of that program the students are given a considerable degree of power or authority. Kohlberg's notion that principles of justice can only be taught in just schools is put into practice as much as possible. The process of student participation in allocation of funds, program requirements, staff selection, and course selection requires that they balance various interest groups, deal with both the prison and university bureaucracy and be able to effect compromises. Thus the classroom work and political atmosphere of daily life complement each other.

Several problems occur in this attempt to establish a just or democratic community within the university program and to have the praxis of that community relate to the content of classroom activity. The university program takes place in almost complete isolation from the surrounding prison environment. The students arrive in the morning and return in the late afternoon. Thus part of their day is spent in an extremely authoritarian environment and the other part in a much more democratic environment. This, of course, produces confusion and tension as one switches roles each day and frequently tries to apply the wrong practices to the wrong community. Other problems stem from the constant influx of new students into the program who are unfamiliar with the style and ideology practised there and assume initially that it is just another prison program. Many students withdraw within a very short time because they do not wish to be challenged in that manner or prefer the antagonism and clarity of the authoritarian environment. Others withdraw later in part because of the tension resulting from having to continually adjust to the two situations.

The content of the academic courses is not deliberately altered to fit either the prison or the moral education aspect of the program. In each discipline, however, the relevance of the academic experience to the larger issues at stake seems clear. For instance, there is the anomaly of students taking part in a program aimed at moral development through cognitive growth taking an advanced developmental psychology course and administering Kohlbergian tests as a class project. Sociology classes

discuss the origins of crime, the status of minority groups and subcultures, and the nature of power in modern society. English classes discuss the ethical issues so central to great literature and invariably bring these issues back to a personal level. In history, the only area on which I can speak from direct experience, the same process occurs. Besides the examples I have discussed above, history has a particular relevance to the more political aspect of the program. One of the dominant self-images of the students is that of risk-taker and, as Elton comments, risk-taking reflects an inability to foresee the results of an action. In their personal life and in their political role within the prison, the students are not skilled tacticians in relations with others. The study of history serves to put the uniqueness of one's personal experience into proper perspective and demonstrates continuously the consequences of human action. It can bring home the fact that one's self affects future events and the fate of others in ways that need thinking about.

History is about people, but more than that it is about people taking action to change or preserve the conditions under which they live. Above all, I stress that history is not an object but rather a process, that people make history, in the past and in the present. By focusing on the two poles of action and conditions, the position of the individual can be shown to be neither victim nor superman. Life becomes a mixture of free will and determinism, not one or the other. Finally, this approach stresses that the individual is not alone in acting or reacting, that he is part of a whole and must act as such. Whether classes, groups, races, or nations is a matter of interpretation, but the linkages are not. By acting responsibly in concert with others, people change and make history.

If all of this is to be in any way effective as a mediating force in a developmental process then it must apply to more than just a new view of the past. First, a more sophisticated and complex view of how history works can alter the student's view of how the present works. Secondly, and most importantly, it can affect the individual's view of his own place in society, provide a context within which to place his own history and provide some insight into how that history can be changed through action. If history is the record of people taking action in relation to conditions, then one's individual life is the same. The essential element is the transition from the intellectual and esoteric to the personal and particular, to show that we are not supermen to the extent that the conditions of our lives set certain parameters within which we act, but neither are we the helpless victims of those conditions.

This paper cannot be concluded without some discussion of results, lest the reader have the impression that our students are hopelessly mired in a Stage 2 egocentric and ultimately criminal moral system. We are not yet able to offer firm quantitative statements as to the cognitive/moral growth developed within this program, but we can offer some reasoned speculation based on several years of observation. There are

four basic responses to the university program, each seemingly correspondent to Kohlberg's Stages 2-5.

The most desirable and different path of development is the movement to a facsimile of Kohlberg's Stage 5, the social contract orientation. This involves a high degree of self-examination and internalization of the moral system and behavior exemplified by the academic community. To my knowledge this has occurred at best three or four times in my five years of experience in the program.

A more reasonable course of development is movement into Kohlberg's Stage 4, requiring the student to be able to differentiate between the prison and the university and accept the rules and moral principles embodied in the society that the university represents. This occurs especially in those students who have discovered or maintained career opportunities which involve further academic or professional work and who come to accept the social norms that go along with these occupational and social aspirations.

More common is movement into Kohlberg's Stage 3, essentially loyalty to the group, in this case the student population of the university and the university program itself. Students frequently discuss their sense of identification with the program and maintain close contact with fellow students and faculty members upon release. While certainly not as desirable as the two previous examples, this development can inhibit further criminal activity since it would be seen as a betrayal of the group's aspirations. As well, it makes for a very cohesive and active student body within the institution.

Finally, a few students doggedly maintain a Stage 2 egocentric orientation throughout their stay with the program. This is unusual because most students who either cannot or choose not to change from this orientation generally leave the program quite early as they perceive the expectations being put on them by the staff and other students. In a few cases, however, and frequently with very bright students, this stage and its attendant behavior are maintained. Needless to say, these students are a source of constant trouble in the daily administration of the program.

NOTES

¹ In a recent Canadian Correctional Service evaluation of the Matsqui program, Douglas Griffin describes it as follows: "In contrast to the individualized approach which is used in most places with equivalency programs, some remarkable exceptions exist. The most obvious and striking example of such an exception is the university program in the Pacific Region. At Matsqui Institution, a building which is set aside for education has been converted into a mini campus of the University of Victoria. Within the confines of this area, inmates who have usually achieved at least a grade 12 standing on the GED examination participate in regular university programs much as they would do on a regular university campus. The lectures they attend are on a normal university time-table, and they have the responsibility of organizing their own work and of using the time between lectures as regular students do. The university staff . . . state that there are extremely important differ-

ences in the approaches which must be taken with inmates from those which are taken with non-inmates. Nevertheless, as an end product, the university atmosphere and the learning which is going on bear striking resemblance to a regular university setting" (Griffin, 1978, p. 79).

- ² In contrast to this prevalent consciousness, the university program tries to establish an atmosphere which might be equated to Kohlberg's Stage 5, described by Kurt Baier as follows: "... we can say that the aim of moral education, as opposed to moral training, is to produce adults who do not simply conform to the morality of their group, but are full moral beings, that is, persons who do what they believe is morally required of them. To produce such adults, moral education must foster in those to be educated three excellences. The first is the knowledge of what the group feels is morally required of one, together with beliefs as sound as possible of what is sound and what is unsound in the group's morality, and what deviations from the group's morality are therefore morally permitted to, or required of, one. The second is the ability to do what one believes or knows is morally required of one. And the third is the willingness to do it" (Baier, 1971, p. 100).
- ³ The argument for criminal as decision-maker does not rely on the acceptance of the primacy of free will in human behavior. Decision making must function in a determined context, a context shaped in part by environment but even more by the consciousness of the actor.
- ⁴ Letkemann goes on to say "... they perceive of the rounder as being more like the square than the 'not true criminal,' in the sense that both act on the basis of choice rather than frustration." In my experience this distinction has also seemed quite clear. One student clearly viewed his first four prison terms as resulting from being "driven to crime" through an inability to compete in the normal world. His last term was spent "getting it together, trying to set some course in life, determine some sort of future, make up for lost time." The crucial difference seemed to be that decisions were being made consciously for the first time. "My decisions were tempered by a great deal of anger, but they were still my decisions." He went on to become a professional bank robber.
- ⁵ For a defence of the affective approach and an attack on Kohlberg's reliance on cognitive growth, see J. Aronfreed's contribution in Beck (1971), especially the transcript of the panel discussions.
- ⁶ While this is not the forum to address the theoretical validity of these ideas, two contentious issues must be acknowledged. First, there is the nature of the relationship between cognitive development and moral development and, secondly, the relationship between moral development and behavior. On neither issue is there anything resembling a consensus among professionals in the field. On the first issue, Kohlberg's point that cognitive development is a "necessary but not sufficient condition" for a parallel moral stage seems a suitable compromise, at least for those who accept the notion of stages of development in the first place. Concerning the second issue, the link between moral reasoning and behavior, almost all would agree that there is little predictive validity to the connection. A great many factors go into forming specific behavior in specific situations, moral reasoning being only one. In a review of Kohlberg's work, Kurtines and Grief conclude that "Overall predictive validity is minimal" (1974, p. 468). As Lickona says, "The search for 'dynamic consistency' — the tendency for a person who holds a particular moral standard to act according to it and to feel guilty when he does not — has produced meager results" (1976, p. 17). Defenders of the connection argue that there are too many variables in determining an individual response to a particular situation, but in the long run moral development will result in relatively consistent behavior. Kohlberg distinguishes between character traits, such as honesty, and moral beliefs, and argues that the latter are most operative in decision-making situations where reasoning is a key to behavior (Peters, 1974, p. 307).
- ⁷ Matza lists five techniques of neutralization: 1. denial of responsibility (I'm sick) 2. denial of injury (they can afford it) 3. denial of victim (we weren't hurting anyone/they had it coming) 4. condemnation of the condemner (everybody is

crooked) 5. appeal to higher loyalties (I didn't do it for myself) (Taylor, 1973, p. 176). Those who absolutely reject accepted moral rules are, from my experience, in the minority though many tend to generalize about all criminals on the basis of this group. Cohen and Taylor link this type of criminal to the romantic anarchist, seeing them both as having come to the conclusion that life cannot be lived fully within present society and that "one can only make out by taking on orthodox society in a direct manner" (1970, p. 9).

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