

Women's Rights: A Seamstress' Analysis

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This paper examines correlative distinctions between the normative and factual senses of rights and the formal and substantive senses of equality of opportunity. Although women frequently have access to formal equality of opportunity, they seldom enjoy substantive equality. This is due to stereotypes which have deep cultural roots in our attitudes, our behaviour, and even our language and which manifest themselves ultimately in low-income jobs and low-status roles for women. The involvement of women in marriage and child-rearing continues to make it difficult for them to leave these inequitable situations. The role of education as an agent of reform is explored.

Cette étude analyse les distinctions entre le sens normatif et le sens factuel des droits ainsi que les distinctions entre le sens formel et le sens substantiel d'égalité des chances. Bien que les femmes aient accès à l'égalité des chances, elles ne bénéficient que rarement d'une réelle égalité. On peut attribuer les raisons de ce phénomène aux stéréotypes qui sont enracinés dans notre culture, dans nos attitudes, dans notre comportement, et même dans notre langage et qui se manifestent dans les emplois mal payés et dans des rôles de deuxième plan en ce qui concerne la femme. La participation des femmes dans le mariage et dans la prise en charge des enfants continue de les empêcher d'échapper aux situations d'inégalité. Le rôle de l'éducation comme agent réformateur est examiné.

INTRODUCTION: SHOULDERING ANALOGIES

Revising rights legislation could be compared to designing the sleeve for a dress. The rounded upper part of the sleeve, as any experienced seamstress will confirm, is the most difficult to sew; this is because it must be fitted into the corresponding front and back pieces of the dress. Achieving the proper fit requires a great deal of skill. Hemming or turning up the lower edge of the sleeve is, on the other hand, a straightforward and uncomplicated task, for this is done completely independently of the rest of the garment. Not so the shoulder, however, where any alteration must be balanced by a corresponding alteration in the other relevant pieces.

Rights are like shoulder pieces in that they can never be understood or constructed independently of the total garment; we must pay careful

attention to alterations required in the social context in order to accommodate changes in rights legislation. All talk of rights is complicated in this sense. The notion of women's rights in particular, the topic of this paper, is complicated by the difficulty in the case of women of ascertaining which portions of the social context are pertinent. This is because much of women's role in our society has been rendered invisible in political and economic analyses; yet their contributions within their traditional role of child rearing in particular are so important that without them the social fabric would disintegrate entirely. If we could carry our seamstress analogy just one step further, much of women's work could be likened to facings, those pieces of the garment which, if well sewn, are never noticed on the outside, but which nevertheless make the garment wearable. It should be noted that to insert a facing well is another feat requiring a high level of sewing skill.

This paper will begin to sort out the interconnections between women's rights and the broad social context. It will be theoretical and philosophical in nature rather than legalistic. No effort will be made to examine in detail current Canadian legislation governing women's rights; rather, the focus will be on the philosophical notions of *right* and *equality*, attempting to provide a clear analysis of these slippery concepts. The second part of the paper will briefly describe the role of women in the broad social context, discussing the features of sex role stereotypes, salary scales in the paid work force, division of labour in the home, and gender-linked language patterns. The final part of the paper will illustrate the interconnectedness between the concepts of rights and equality and the broad social context, in particular, indicating radical changes likely in the social context from any alterations in the operant notions of rights and equality with regard to women. The paper concludes with a discussion of some of the implications which this analysis holds for educational policy and social reform.

RIGHTS AND EQUALITY: AN ATTEMPT AT CLARIFICATION

The history of philosophy testifies eloquently to the difficulty of defining rights and equality. No attempt will be made here to improve upon this testimony nor even to report it thoroughly. But this literature provides some insights which will be instrumental in clarifying women's rights.

Right is a word which slips back and forth between the normative and the factual realms so readily that it is frequently confusing. In the normative sense, a right is something which one ought to have (or *has* by definition) on the basis of one's membership in the human race. When right is used normatively in this sense, it generally refers to a natural or a moral right, naturally accruing to individuals because of their moral

capacity. (It is an interesting corollary of this view that, where the perceived moral capacity of groups differs significantly, natural rights may legitimately differ as well. Aristotle's highly influential analysis in the *Politics* of the differing moral capacities of men, women, and slaves is particularly instructive in this regard (McKeon, 1941, p. 1132 [Becker reference 1254b 12–14]).) In addition to being used normatively, right is frequently used in a factual sense, where it refers to a right which is endorsed and protected by the legal and judicial machinery of a society. When right is used factually in this sense, it generally refers to a legal or juristic right, a right which an individual possesses by virtue of membership in a certain society. Hence, we might say in the normative sense, "All people have the right to free speech," and, in the factual sense, "There is no right to free speech in East Germany." These statements are not contradictory because the term right is used in a different sense in each case; unless we are clear about the different senses, however, confusion could ensue.

Ideally, a system of legally endorsed rights would spring from an adequate analysis of natural or moral rights. Since volumes have been written attempting to analyze natural rights alone, such a task will not be undertaken here. The *conjunction* of these two senses of right is very important: natural rights without legislative support have no teeth, and legal or jurisdic rights without moral foundations may well defy basic principles of justice.

Equality is at least as difficult as the term right to define precisely. The notion of equality, as it occurs in the classic constitutional principle "All men are created equal," reveals some of the inherent complexity of the term. The statement does not tell us that everyone is created identical – the falsity of this proclamation would be obvious. What then does it mean? The following suggestions, for example, would make sense of the principle: all people are born with equal rights to protection under the law, all people are born with equal dignity and worth as human beings, all people are born with an equal right to lead happy, fulfilling lives, or all people ought to be treated as ends in themselves and never merely as means. These translations of the principle, as we can see, are highly abstract and do not correlate clearly to any specific set of circumstances.

This illustrates the difficulty of translating the ideal of equality into any specific kind of arrangement. This is quite independent of the difficulty of bringing such arrangements to fruition – simply being able to *identify* them is an enormously difficult task. Instead of the general issue of equality, this paper will focus more specifically on *equality of opportunity*. I shall bring some specificity to the discussion by *stipulating* that equality of opportunity be used to include equal access to social goods, such as job

opportunities, educational and training programs, and an acceptable standard of living.

This paper compares women and men and claims that women have the right to equality of opportunity with men. It is worth noting that if we focused on other groups, such as the elderly, the young, or the handicapped, our claim would be perceived as much more problematic. In fact, it might appear that the claim regarding gender is not controversial at all and that, furthermore, in many parts of the world, including Canada, women do have equality of opportunity with men. There are at the present time no official university entrance requirements, for example, which explicitly deny admission to women. Employers are not permitted, by the law of the land, to specify in an advertisement that they are seeking a male rather than a female candidate to fill a job opening. No professional programs or apprenticeships are officially closed to women. Even the Senate and the police forces have opened their official doors to women.

So, in what sense could we claim that equality of opportunity does not exist for women in this country? As an initial step in answering this question, I shall outline the distinction made by O'Neill (1977) between formal and substantive equality of opportunity. According to O'Neill's analysis, *formal equality* of opportunity has been satisfied if only there are no legal or quasi-legal impediments to the distribution of equal treatment to members of relevant groups. It is clear that, on this formal notion, women do indeed have equality of opportunity with men in this country. They have not always enjoyed formal equality of opportunity with men – our educational history testifies to the official exclusion of women from attendance at university in general and admission to professional programs in particular (Gillett, 1981, pp. 1–18). Now that such official sanctions against women have been legally outlawed, Canadian women at last possess formal equality of opportunity with men. The requirement for *substantive equality* of opportunity is satisfied only when members of relevant groups are equally likely to be represented (i.e., in proportion to their numbers in the population) in all educational programs, income-brackets, and employment categories.

Women are nowhere near possessing substantive equality of opportunity in this country. The areas in the paid work force where women are concentrated, clerical work and the service industries, are frequently referred to as female ghetto areas because they have become identified with low salaries and stunted opportunities for advancement. And, even in these traditional female areas, women earn much less than male co-workers. In all employment areas, including the professions, women

workers are concentrated in the lower echelons, and their earnings are a fraction of the earnings of male workers in the same field (Women's Bureau, 1982, p. 2). Women, especially old women, are much more likely to live beneath the poverty line than men, and female-headed single-parent families are much more likely to be poor than male-headed single-parent families (p. 1). Canadian women do not enjoy substantive equality of opportunity with men, a fact which will be dealt with more thoroughly in the next section of this paper.

The notions of formal and substantive equality of opportunity, as they have been presented, constitute two extremes of a broad spectrum one end of which exemplifies the mere negative condition that there be no legal or quasi-legal constraints on women's equality of opportunity while the other end exemplifies a real and positive equality of women with men. In order to achieve substantive equality of opportunity, it will not be sufficient to do away with discriminatory laws. It will be necessary to institute positive social measures of support – that is, it will be necessary to institute affirmative action. This is because the concept of formal equality of opportunity does not remedy the fact that the history of oppression itself has become a handicap for women. Women start out behind; elimination of legal or quasi-legal bias is not enough. Compensatory action will have to be taken to get women to the same starting point as men.

Proposals for compensatory justice will vary widely in terms of how closely they approach the notion of substantive equality. For example, a weak proposal for compensation would demand that the ratio of women to men in any given job area equal the ratio of qualified women to qualified men in that area. This model is recommended as a guide to hiring practices by Ezorsky (1977). According to it, if one fifth of the nation's doctoral degrees in mathematics were held by women, we should expect one fifth of all university teaching posts in mathematics to be held by women. On this proposal, unqualified women, those without doctorates, would have no right to compensation. Consequently, this proposal does not consider women who failed to qualify as a result of wrongs suffered though no fault of their own.

A stronger proposal might demand that women be represented in mathematics teaching posts in the same proportion as their representation in undergraduate mathematics programs. This strengthened proposal now accounts for women who were interested in studying mathematics but were eliminated, through no fault of their own, somewhere en route to the doctorate. This model still fails to consider all those women who never even register in a university mathematics course because, as

young children, they were socialized to believe such endeavours only suited males.

The strongest proposal, one which fully meets the conditions of substantive equality, is that women be represented in university mathematics teaching posts in proportion to their representation in the population. This strong version is advocated by English (1978) for professional sports. Whatever the justice of such schemes, they present almost insuperable problems of implementation.

WOMEN'S ROLE AND THE SOCIAL WEB

The role of women in society is complex, a fact which blocks possible social reforms and compensatory measures that might alleviate the unequal opportunities available to them. Four features of the broad social context will be addressed: sex role stereotypes, division of labour in the family, salary scales in the paid work force, and gender-linked language patterns. The conjunction of these features illustrates the difficulties for women attempting to attain real equality of opportunity.

Sex Role Stereotypes

In a summary of their research on sex role stereotypes, Broverman, Vogel, Broverman, Clarkson, and Rosenkrantz (1972) indicated that people operated with stereotyped views of both *actual* and *ideal* male and female attitudes, behaviours, and capacities. Included among the descriptive features for the ideal female were the following: very dependent, not at all ambitious, disliking math and science very much, not at all aggressive, very uncomfortable about being aggressive, very submissive, very quiet, very emotional in a minor crisis, and not at all competitive. The ideal male, on the other hand, was perceived as very independent, very ambitious, liking math and science very much, very aggressive, not at all uncomfortable about being aggressive, very dominant, very loud, not at all emotional in a minor crisis, and very competitive.

Such views were not limited to the working class or the uneducated but were shared by university students (Rosenkrantz, Vogel, Bee, Broverman, & Broverman, 1968) as well as practicing clinical psychologists (Broverman, Broverman, Clarkson, Rosenkrantz, & Vogel, 1970). Unfortunately, these ideas have not been outgrown. A 1978 survey of a large undergraduate psychology course (278 subjects) at The University of Western Ontario showed that these students still perceived *ideal* females and *ideal* males in terms of the stereotyped features (Ayim & Raphael, 1983).

Division of Labour in the Family

Interest has developed in a topic once thought too trivial and boring for enlightened people to discuss – housework. The author of “The Politics of Housework” writes, towards the end of her article, “I was just finishing this when my husband came in and asked what I was doing. Writing a paper on housework. Housework? he said, *Housework*. Oh my god how trivial can you get. A paper on housework” (Mainardi, 1978, p. 37).

In spite of the too-trivial-to-talk-about syndrome, some professionals have started to talk about housework, to say that it is neither trivial nor boring but an important part of the whole picture of the status of women in this society. *Homemaker's Magazine* conducted a study of housework in Canada (Kome, 1978). From 2,974 answered questionnaires on housework, they randomly selected a 10% sample and some of the following information emerged. Full-time homemakers spend on the average $8\frac{1}{2}$ hours per day doing household chores and $8\frac{3}{4}$ hours per day looking after children, making for a total work week of $87\frac{1}{2}$ to $94\frac{1}{2}$ hours (p. 32). Part-time homemakers spend an average of $6\frac{1}{2}$ hours per day doing household chores.

The amount of help and support given to married working women by their families is depressing. Whether women worked or not, husbands were reported to spend an average of $1\frac{1}{2}$ hours per day with the children. Working mothers received more help with the household chores from their families, but even here much is left to be desired: “only 6 out of 10 homemakers indicated that their husbands do any specific chores around the house” (p. 36). Among part-time homemakers, two thirds acknowledged the sharing of some duties by husbands whereas only one half of the full-time homemakers acknowledged such help. As well, children were expected to share more of the chores of women holding jobs outside the home (p. 42).

The sample questionnaires also indicated that 41% of the full-time homemakers with children and 30% of the part-time homemakers with children had *no* alternative arrangements for children. It is small wonder that women are criticized for losing time at work when their children are ill or the schools close for professional development days.

These statistics show that, until women are relieved of some responsibilities of child care and housework, it is unrealistic to expect much time or energy to be left for bettering themselves in the job or the profession. A person, man or woman, who works outside the home for 8 hours and then does $6\frac{1}{2}$ hours of household chores will understandably be less than enthusiastic about taking a university evening course to upgrade qualifications.

Specifically, two implications are to be drawn from this. If husband and wife have equal rights to self-development through a career or job of any sort, this *entails* that they share equally the responsibilities of child rearing and household chores. Since women in this society carry the bulk of the child-rearing burden, they can never have equal opportunities with men until adequate day-care facilities are made available.

Salary Scales in the Paid Work Force

Work force statistics reflect this idealized image of the submissive dependent woman. In 1980, over one half (54%) of all working women in Canada were concentrated in clerical posts and the service industries (Women's Bureau, 1982, p. 2). In 1980, women clerical workers earned 64% of what male clerical workers earned, and for females employed in the service industries the proportion dipped to 50%. When all occupations were considered, the proportion of female to male salaries was 59% (p. 2). Dependence is not just a perceived ideal for women; for many, it is the grim reality which defines and confines their lives. Whereas 12% of all Canadian families were categorized as low income in 1980, this figure rose to 43% for female-headed Canadian families (p. 1).

Women dominate only the lower positions of the pyramid of the teaching profession: their huge majority among elementary school teachers dwindles to a tiny minority of those in positions of added responsibility (and remuneration!). A recent report on women teachers in the university system indicates that, as of 1983–84, women constituted only 16% of all full-time university teachers in Ontario (Tancred-Sheriff, 1985, p. 6). The dwindling proportion of women in the higher professorial ranks of the university is common knowledge. Lower pay for women and concentration in the lower echelons of the job area is standard to many jobs, including teaching (Abella, 1984, p. 74).

Gender-Linked Language Patterns

Language patterns further entrench these stereotypes. In conversational exchanges between males and females, men define and alter the topic of conversation whereas women sustain the privilege by listening well, nodding, smiling, and interjecting supportive comments (Fishman, 1977). Interruption of female by male speakers is systematic and so common that it goes basically unnoticed (Zimmerman & West, 1975, pp. 116–117; Key, 1975). Studies available on *amount* of talking controvert the notion of the gossipy, loquacious woman. Men do *far* more of the talking than women (Spender, 1980, pp. 41–42). Why then do so many of

us (men and women included) hold the view that women talk on and on non-stop, so that men cannot "get a word in edgewise"? The widespread prevalence of this false view makes sense if we assume that women ought to be quiet; then, however little they say (compared to men), they will be perceived as too talkative and even verbose (Spender, pp. 42-43).

The number and type of words to describe a group frequently indicate how the group is perceived by members of that language community. In English, there are over ten times as many words referring to women as to men in derogatory ways, often with sexual over-tones (Spender, 1980, p. 15).

These facets of the social context help us understand the backdrop against which to view any recommendations for compensatory measures which would implement women's rights.

ROLES, RIGHTS, AND REFORM: THE THREE RS OF THE FUTURE

The interconnectedness between facets of the social structure and their possible impact on significant compensatory measures impedes reform. We have already seen how equal opportunity in the paid work force is denied by the typical division of labour in the family. In assuming the bulk of the unpaid labour-intensive duties of child-care and home-making, women will have less time and energy to devote to improving their qualifications and undertaking any advance up the corporate ladder. Gender-linked language patterns show how deeply entrenched these roles and patterns are. Sex role stereotypes form a very strong basis for these different sets of patterns and expectations. Against this, what possible reform measure could generate real equality of opportunity for women?

In discussing substantive equality of opportunity, we indicated as ideal the representation of women in all educational programs, income-brackets, and employment categories in proportion to their numbers in the population. Sex role stereotypes in our society *seriously* undercut possible substantive equality of opportunity. For the socialization patterns operant in this society portray an ideal woman as a person who is submissive, dependent, emotional, subjective, excitable in a minor crisis, not competitive, not logical, not ambitious, not mathematical or scientific, and a docile follower (Broverman et al., 1972, p. 63). It is difficult to imagine the requisite numbers of such women wanting and striving for highly responsible employment positions.

One of two conditions would have to be met in order to ensure sufficient numbers of female candidates. The first is to force them into job areas regardless of their wishes, and the second is to change their wants so

as to accord with the equal representation scheme. The first suggestion would involve forcing the required number of the best qualified women into the positions in question and then providing them with on-the-job training. The problems with this suggestion are three-fold. First, it would invite unprecedented levels of incompetence, given that many of the women would not even approach the required qualification level – leading to backlash rejecting qualified female applicants as well. Second, the candidates themselves would resist being forced into employment areas against their will, and their reluctance rather than their capacity to succeed might well be reflected in their performance. Third, it is morally questionable whether we would advocate forcing people into employment areas not of their choice except in extreme circumstances. Although this objection is mitigated by women's choices currently being shaped by socialization patterns over which they have no control and which are clearly less in their interests than in the interests of men, nevertheless, ensuring equal representation of women in all employment levels by forcing them into the required categories against their wishes is fraught with difficulties.

The second means is to alter their wants to accord with the equal representation scheme. There are two possible ways of accomplishing this objective. One is to attempt to reverse the socialization process now operating in our society; little optimism for the success of this plan seems justified, however, since social agencies will continue to perpetuate the value scheme currently in vogue. The most obvious social institution for bringing about such changes, the school system, is also among the most conservative of these institutions and is unlikely to welcome or encourage such radical shifts in values.

The second possible mechanism for altering women's wants is not reverse socialization but education for political awareness. Following this option, young girls, while still formulating certain life plans and realistically preparing themselves accordingly, would be educated in many currently non-existent ways. Such education would consist basically of three features. First, emphasis would be directed towards increasing their proficiency in precisely those areas popularly defined as masculine territory – for example, in the academic disciplines of mathematics, science, and logic as well as in developing leadership and business skills.

Second, every effort would be made to augment their self-esteem and their self-confidence in their own abilities. This feature is of particular importance, given that self-esteem accurately measures one's willingness to assert one's rights. Persons with low self-esteem will tend to believe that they do not deserve many rights and will thus not pursue those rights or challenge infringements upon them. In other words, people with low

self-esteem may acquiesce in their own oppression, believing that they do not deserve better treatment. This problem is viciously circular as persons whose rights are traditionally trampled upon will also tend to have low self-esteem. Just social policies which guarantee disadvantaged people the freedom to exercise their rights will raise their self-esteem, thus encouraging them to defend and exercise their rights even farther. So, socialization patterns that enhance women's self-esteem should correlatively increase the likelihood that they will identify themselves with a full set of rights, protect those rights, and exercise them freely. (A similar point was made by Strike, 1979.)

Third, young girls must also learn that current socialization programs make it extremely difficult for a woman not to want to marry, raise a family, and assume responsibility for the household chores. There is no monetary recompense for duties incurred through the fulfillment of this want nor are there standard working benefits such as time-and-a-half for overtime, sick leave, unemployment insurance, or vacation pay. Women assume almost all the responsibility for household and child-rearing tasks with little or no help from other members of the family. At the same time, financial necessity will for several decades force large proportions of these women into the paid work force where they will be discriminated against for having spent their time in these traditional female endeavours rather than in some area of paid work. Their time spent in the home or with children will be given less recognition in terms of previous work experience than selling beer in a pub despite the fact that the child-rearing role is crucial to the survival of society. They will also be exposed to the fact of female ghettos even in the paid work force – areas typically dominated by women are much lower in salary and status than traditional male areas involving analogous skill and training. Seamstresses and carpenters may be compared in this regard, as can secretaries and draftspeople. They will be exposed to divorce rate realities and the dramatically poor record of social agencies in collecting alimony and child care payments from ex-husbands.

One practical difficulty militates against education for political awareness: the school, the obvious social institution to effect such a program, is tightly constrained by conservative and traditional concerns. But even if the schools did comply and this type of educational program were successfully launched, we would face a problem of overwhelming proportions: equal representation of women in the well-paid, high-status job areas would entail drastic shortages of women for the secretarial or the service industry labour force. If girls learned these facts at a time in their lives when many options could be explored, who would choose the path with the lowest financial pay-off? One might claim here

that many men work in low-paid areas, but *when compared to traditional woman's work* these areas are relatively well paid. Few women would choose to stay at home and work an 87½ hour week for no pay at all and very few benefits. Nor will females flock to the call of volunteer agencies. After that full day at the office or driving a transport, she will not have much energy left to campaign for a (male) political candidate or participate in a fund-raising drive for the handicapped. Women may even decide that they have no time to have children, for who would look after them?

Our society could not bear the financial burden of equal rights for women. The right to equal pay for equal work would require immense compensatory measures. It has been estimated that, if Canadian employers were to compensate women for the difference between their salary and that of a male doing the same work, it would cost those employers \$7 billion annually (McDonald, 1975, p. 6) without even taking account of the concentration of female workers in ghetto areas. American statistics tell us that equal wages for equal work would have cost employers in the United States \$96 billion in 1970, but coupled with equal female access to number of work hours, the cost of retribution would have more than tripled to \$303 billion (Eisenstein, 1978, p. 6). If husbands were to compensate their wives for their years of unpaid work in the house, only a handful of very rich men would not be pushed into bankruptcy. The economy of the country would be altered beyond all recognition if this model for reform were to be instituted. Our male-oriented society must regard equal rights for women as an unaffordable luxury.

Ensuring women equal access to social goods may be drawing the blueprint for the demise of society. One wonders if this fear explained the injustice suffered by women over the years – that their role was *so* important to society that they were denied the freedom to choose other types of roles. No one male role even approached in magnitude or importance the child-bearing and child-rearing role, so it was safe to allow men considerable latitude in selecting life-styles. Within the total social framework, the choices of men would make ripples, but analogous choices for women would be a tidal wave sweeping society.

Accepting that women cannot bear and raise babies without compromise of some type, the solution (at least the just solution) requires that these roles be guaranteed by some other means than the subjugation of women. To what means should we look then? Since the whole problem of women's rights is closely connected with our society's definition of sex roles, clues for reform may come from a closer examination of these sex roles.

Psychological surveys reveal that many bipolar features differentiate

the popular conception of the ideal man and the ideal woman, at least in North American society. In this list of items, a distinction has been made between those features whose masculine pole is considered more socially valuable and those whose feminine pole is considered more socially valuable. The following are some typical male-valued characteristics: very dominant, almost always acts as a leader, not at all easily influenced, very aggressive, not at all uncomfortable about being aggressive, very independent, not at all emotional, very worldly, very adventurous, liking math and science very much, not at all excitable in a minor crisis, very skilled in business, very direct, and making decisions easily. The following are some typical female-valued characteristics: very gentle, very aware of feelings of others, not using harsh language at all, easily expressing tender feelings, and enjoying art and literature (Broverman et al., 1972, p. 63).

I shall explore what appears a difference in logic between the bulk of the male-valued characteristics and the female-valued characteristics. The first two male-valued characteristics in my list of examples – very dominant and almost always acts as a leader – *could not obtain without* presupposing that opposite poles described other people. More specifically, dominant personalities require submissive people whom they can dominate. And since dominance is valued only in males in this society, it follows logically that submissiveness will be seen as a valuable female characteristic. A similar logic holds for the leadership feature. The problem for females is that dominance and leadership are highly valued and liberally rewarded features in the realm of employment whereas submissiveness and lack of leadership are serious handicaps. Logically, in order for males to possess these two features, females must develop the opposite characteristics, which will seriously hamper their access to a wide variety of social goods. Thus, maleness, as defined in this society, presupposes the oppression of females.

Other male-valued characteristics also exemplify this feature but more weakly. While it is logically possible that the world should contain only individuals who were not at all easily influenced, very aggressive, not at all emotional, and very worldly, such a world would not be very comfortable. If no person were easily influenced, no one could hope to influence any one else without great difficulty, and much of the mutual trust and co-operative enterprise on which any social structure depends would be ruled out. Much the same point could be made concerning the other examples.

There are six male-valued features of an entirely different type. Neither logic nor the concept of a cohesive society are jarred by the possibility that everyone be adventurous, like math and science very much, not be excitable in a minor crisis, be skilled in business, be very

direct, and be capable of making decisions easily. For one set of people to like math and science very much does not presuppose that another group dislike these disciplines, unlike the dominance of one set of people which does presuppose the submissiveness of another set. Although it may be unlikely that all individuals would develop these features, such an occurrence would not threaten social cohesiveness in the sense in which universal aggression and worldliness would. In fact, higher levels of these features would mark a healthier society: the more people who possessed them, the better.

It is important to note that all female-valued characteristics are like this. For one set of people to be very gentle, very aware of the feelings of others, not to use harsh language, to express tender feelings with ease, and to enjoy art and literature does not demand another set of people defined by the opposite poles of these features. Furthermore, the greater the number of people in any society who possess these features, the happier and healthier such a society would be. Only the male-valued features contain items which either require another set of people to possess the opposite features or would undermine the foundations of society if they were universally possessed.

An important observation must be made about these value clusters. While the female-valued characteristics receive a kind of sentimental recognition in this society, only the male-valued ones receive monetary recognition and lead to upward mobility in the work force. This is very problematic, given that many male-valued features would, if widespread in their occurrence, be antithetical to the smooth running of a happy society, while others of these features feed on the oppression of women. Furthermore, this occurs only within the context of a male-oriented value scheme which both rewards assertiveness, aggressiveness, dominance, ambition, self-confidence, and leadership with easy access to social goods and at the same time socializes people to regard females possessed of such characteristics with aversion that some compensatory scheme seems required.

It seems clear that a more just society, one more conducive to equality between the sexes, would value, reward, and educate for qualities from the female-value cluster or the analogous third category of male-valued characteristics. These values would include competence and interest in both mathematics or sciences and the arts, personal qualities like calmness and gentleness, decisiveness and directness, and interpersonal qualities like consideration of the feelings of others, ability to express affection and tenderness, and reluctance to use abusive language. While rewarding both "female" nurturing and "male" competence, it would discourage aggression, whether directed against females or the society at large. At the

global level, these qualities could help to address such problems as maintaining peace and averting environmental catastrophe.

These suggestions entail sweeping alterations in our life-styles, our expectations, and our patterns of work, leisure, and parenting. But, if the alternative is to deny to half the human beings on the face of the earth real freedom to exercise their rights, who among us would thwart this call for change? To conclude with the paper's introductory analogy, in refashioning the sleeve, the whole dress will have to be remade. But it will be a better dress for all of that, one which our society may wear with greater pride and justice.

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Voneinander abhängige Unterscheidungen zwischen den normativen und tatsächlichen Rechtsinhalten und zwischen den formellen und substantiven Möglichkeitsgleichheitsinhalten werden in dieser Arbeit gemacht. Obwohl Trauen oft Zugänglichkeiten für formelle Möglichkeitsgleichheit haben, genießen sie selten substantive Gleichheit. Die Gründe dafür haben ihre Anfänge in Stereotypen, die in unseren Haltungen, in unserem Benehmen und sogar in unserer Sprache kulturell tief verwurzelt sind, und die sich schließlich in Jobs mit niedrigem Gehalt und in Rollen mit niedrigem Rang für Trauen manifestieren. Da die Trauen sich in der Ehe und in der Kindererziehung verwickeln ist es immer noch schwer, aus diesen ungerechten Situationen ausubrechen. Die Rolle der Bildung als Reformsagent wird untersucht.

Este estudio plantea las distinciones correlativas entre los sentidos real y normativo de los derechos y de la igualdad de oportunidad. A pesar de que la mujer formalmente goza de igualdad de oportunidades, la realidad es otra. Las razones pueden deducirse de estereotipos provenientes de profundas raíces culturales en nuestras actitudes, comportamiento e inclusive lenguaje, todo lo cual se manifiesta en pocos ingresos, subempleo y bajo estatus. El papel de la mujer en el hogar y el cuidado de los hijos sigue siendo un obstáculo para poner fin a estas situaciones. Se explora, también, la función de la educación como agente de reforma en este sentido.

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